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The World 
MACROECONOMIC TRENDS 
Economic growth continued to decrease for most 
major industrialised countries in the second 
quarter of 1990. GDP growth in the G7 countries 
in the year to June actually accelerated 
fractionally to 2.8% (from 2.6% in the year to 
March), but this was almost totally due to the 
very rapid growth of the Japanese economy; year-
on-year growth in Japan stood at 7.5% in June. 
Most other G7 countries saw growth slow quite 
sharply in the second quarter. This was 
especially the case in the US, where annual growth 
slowed to 1.6%, barely half the level achieved in 
1989. Growth rates for the remaining G7 countries 
(excluding Italy) were as follows: Canada 1.4; 
France 2.1%; Germany 3.4%; UK 2.6%. 
Industrial production in the major industrialised 
countries showed a fairly sharp rise in the second 
quarter of 1990, increasing at an annual rate of 
2.2% for both the G7 and the OECD as a whole. 
This was almost entirely attributable to the 
performance of Japan and Germany, where in the 
year to July production rose at an annual rate of 
6.1% and 5.0% respectively. The US and France 
also experienced modest rises in production during 
the second quarter, in contrast to Italy and the 
UK where industrial output continued to falter. 
G7 performances were as follows: US 1.5% (year to 
August); UK 0.2% (year to July); France 1.3%; 
Economy 
Italy 0.1% (both year to June); Canada -2.2% (year 
to May). 
Following a slight lull in the early part of the 
year, inflationary pressures have clearly re-
emerged in most OECD countries. In the year to 
August average OECD inflation was 6.6% and that 
for G7 countries 5.2%. In the latter case this 
represents a rise of almost one percentage point 
from the position in May. All G7 countries, with 
the exception of Canada, experienced some increase 
in the rate of consumer price inflation over the 
year to August, with the largest increases being 
experienced by the US and the UK. The US 
situation is particularly interesting given that 
much of the concern being voiced about that 
economy relates to the possibility of a recession 
rather than of inflation. 
Consumer price inflation in G7 countries for the 
year to August was as follows: Canada 4.1%; US 
5.6%; Japan 2.9%; France 3.5%; Germany 2.8%; Italy 
6.3%; UK 10.6%. 
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Labour Market 
Unemployment in the OECD overall has remained 
virtually unchanged since the beginning of the 
year. In July the average OECD figure remained at 
6.0%, with G7 countries continuing to fare 
slightly better with an average of 5.5%. In the 
three months to July unemployment rose in Canada 
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(sharply), the US, Germany and the UK, and fell in 
France (sharply) and Italy. Japanese unemployment 
remained unchanged. Unemployment rates for 
individual countries were as follows (in August 
unless otherwise stated): Canada 8.3%; US 5.5%; 
Japan 2.1% (July); France 8.9%; Germany 5.2% 
(July); Italy 9.6% (April); UK 6.3%. 
United States 
After months of wrangling, a budget for the US was 
finally set during October. This involved the 
acceptance of the largest deficit-reducing package 
in US history; the budget deficit should now be 
reduced by $41 billion during fiscal year 1991, 
and by a total of $492 billion over five years. 
The measures adopted to achieve these deficit 
reductions were accepted reluctantly by President 
Bush, not least because they involved considerable 
increases in taxation. The top marginal rate of 
income tax will be raised from 28% to 31%, excise 
taxes on petrol, alcohol and tobacco will rise, 
and a 10% "luxury" tax has been imposed on 
aircraft, boats, cars, furs and jewellery (items 
which many Americans would surely regard as 
necessities). Some spending cuts will also be 
imposed, and the measures will benefit from 
reduced debt interest payments due to lower 
interest rates. 
The measures had to be fairly substantial because 
of the size of the federal budget deficit, 
standing at $294 billion for fiscal year 1991. 
Some commentators have argued that the $41 billion 
reduction in the coming year is no more than a 
token gesture, which will still leave the deficit 
running at a high level by the end of 1991-92. It 
is unlikely that the President sees the budget as 
a gesture, especially because of the need to raise 
an extra $137 billion in taxes over the next five 
years despite the infamous "watch my lips" speech. 
More problematic is whether the expected 
elimination of the deficit in four years can 
actually be achieved. The deficit reducing 
package was enacted under the Gramm-Rudman laws 
which have been around for some time. The first 
statutory targets under this legislation were 
introduced in 1985, and were aimed at eliminating 
the deficit (then $172 billion) by 1990. These 
targets were first revised in 1987, and the new 
budget agreement represents a second revision. 
The whole idea of the Gramm-Rudman legislation was 
that it should be both firm and inflexible, but 
the 1990 version is not only less ambitious than 
its predecessors but considerably more flexible. 
The targeted reductions can be altered depending 
on the economic situation, which some see as a 
guarantee that they will not be achieved. As it 
is, the targets are based on a very rapid 
improvement in the economic climate in 1992 and 
beyond, following officially-forecast growth of 
0.7% in 1990 and 1.3% in 1991. In fact, it seems 
possible that growth will slow to zero or less in 
1991, putting the deficit reduction plans into 
some jeopardy. 
The expected (indeed promised) cut in interest 
rates occurred immediately the budget was set, a 
slight reduction in the Federal Reserve rate from 
8% to 7.75%. This was the first cut since mid-
July, and the comments of the Reserve Chairman, 
Alan Greenspan, indicated that his concerns over 
inflation would prevent further reductions in the 
short run despite cries of recession from other 
quarters. Despite weak consumer demand and a 
collapsing housing market, Mr Greenspan still 
takes the view that there will be no recession in 
the United States. And, at least until war in the 
Gulf began to appear more likely, he took a 
relaxed attitude on the impact of higher oil 
prices on the economy, expecting growth to be cut 
by one percentage point and inflation to rise by 
up to two percentage points. Forecasts are not 
helped, however, by official figures which are 
subject to heavy revision. GNP estimates of 1.8% 
annual growth based on provisional third quarter 
data were met with widespread disbelief, not least 
because second quarter growth of 1.2% was later 
revised to just 0.4%. 
Japan 
While the US is undecided about whether inflation 
or recession is the main area of concern, the 
Japanese authorities are in no doubt that 
inflation is the principal problem to be combated. 
With consumer prices still rising at below 3% per 
annum this may seem rather extreme, at least by UK 
standards; but there are good reasons for this 
attitude. Japan is heavily dependent on oil 
imports and, despite having an economy which is 
markedly less energy intensive than was the case 
in the 1970s, is still one of the G7 countries 
most exposed to an oil price shock. In addition, 
the country is experiencing an output boom with 
very buoyant consumer demand and acute labour 
shortages in many areas, which has been putting 
upward pressure on wages. The official reaction 
to this has been to raise the official discount 
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rate to 6%, the sixth rise in eighteen months, and 
possibly not the last in the near future. 
Unlike America, where there is some fear of higher 
oil prices engendering recession, the Japanese 
economy is too buoyant for this to happen. Real 
GNP grew at an annual rate of 7.5% in the second 
quarter, an increase from an annual rate of 6.0% 
in the first quarter. As was shown earlier, 
industrial output is also growing very rapidly (an 
increase of 6.0% in the year to August), and 
consumer demand is steady. Even if war in the 
Gulf led to much higher oil prices it seems 
unlikely that Japanese economic growth would fall 
below 3%, an outcome helped by the recent 
appreciation of the Yen. During September and 
October the Yen appreciated by 15% against the 
dollar, ameliorating the effects of a higher 
dollar price of oil. The renewed strength of the 
Yen in turn led to a recovery in equity prices and 
some semblance of order in the Japanese banking 
and financial system, which is still going through 
a crisis of confidence. 
In addition, Japan is now much more efficient than 
it used to be in the use of oil and of energy 
generally. According to Nomura Securities, oil 
imports as a percentage of GNP fell from 5.4% in 
1980 to 1.1% in 1989, and oil prices now have 
little effect on consumer prices. A possibly more 
acute problem faced by Japan is a rapidly 
tightening labour market. Unemployment continues 
to be very low at around 2.1%, and the ratio of 
job offers to applicants continues to be high by 
recent standards, reaching 1.45 in July. The Bank 
of Japan quarterly short-term survey of business 
outlook for August indicated that a net 40% of 
companies foresaw a labour shortage in the 
immediate future, a figure which has increased 
steadily since the beginning of 1988. These 
factors have coincided with a 12% year-on-year 
increase in the money supply, indicating that 
concerns over inflationary pressures are not 
misplaced. 
Despite the rise in equity prices mentioned above, 
there is still evidence of difficulties in the 
Japanese banking system. Financial deregulation 
has led to a rash of mergers between some of the 
medium and larger banks in Japan, most recently 
between Kyowa Bank and Saitama Bank to create the 
eighth largest commercial bank in Japan. Coupled 
with the uncertainties of deregulation has been 
the ruling by the Bank for International 
Settlements that most banks should raise their 
capital adequacy ratios (setting minimum levels 
for the ratio of capital to assets) by 1993. 
While European and American banks have tried to 
achieve this by reducing their assets, Japanese 
banks have been raising their assets fairly 
rapidly in recent years but trying to raise their 
capital even more quickly. Since much of this 
activity was equity based, this was made 
impossible by the collapse in the stock market; 
Japanese banks now find themselves not only 
turning away new business but also having to sell 
off loans, traditionally not done in Japanese 
banking. These factors have led to the fear that 
1991 may see a "credit crunch' for Japanese 
borrowers which may jeopardise the rapid rate of 
economic growth. 
Consumer price Indices 
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Most of German thinking on the economy is 
dominated by the costs and benefits of unification 
between East and West. While there is now 
nominally a single federal state, it has been made 
clear that for the foreseeable future there will 
continue to be an East-West split in economic 
terms. This will be both practical, as the West 
booms and the East slumps, and in terms of 
economic information, as a key problem appears to 
be obtaining accurate data on the state of the 
East German economy. 
It now seems clear that many aspects of the costs 
of unification have been considerably 
underestimated. The credit needs of the Treuhand 
which was established to oversee the transition of 
East German industry to the free market (as far as 
possible) are now thought to be nearer DM35 
5 
billion by the end of 1991 than the DM25 billion 
originally allocated. This is in part because the 
industry of the East was in even worse shape than 
had been anticipated, and partly because 
commercial investment from the West has been 
slower to materialise than had been hoped. This 
has not been helped by the need to sack all 
fifteen Communist-appointed regional directors of 
the Treuhand and replace them with West German 
business executives. 
In the short run East Germany's economy will 
suffer badly. Industry has lost most of its 
Eastern European orders and up to 50% of its 
domestic consumer goods market; with one-to-one 
parity between the OstMark and D-Mark East German 
consumers can afford to buy Western goods. In the 
year to August the Bundesbank estimates that East 
German industrial production fell by 51%. 
Unemployment is now officially above 5% and 
rising, excluding the 1.72 million people on 
short-time work, and East German GNP is expected 
to fall by up to 16% in 1990 and a further 10% in 
1991. A recession of this severity is felt 
necessary to ensure that the economy of the East 
can compete in world markets in as short a period 
of time as possible, and the worst of the 
recession is expected to have passed by the third 
quarter of next year. 
However, economic unification in such a short time 
scale would not be possible without a strong West 
German economy. In the year to September West 
Germany created 700,000 new jobs, more than enough 
to accommodate all those still coming in from the 
East. Growth in the West's economy is expected to 
peak this year at 4% before falling to 2.5% in 
1991, which should be sufficient to pay the 
substantial cost of unification, which is expected 
to necessitate extra government borrowings of DM70 
billion this year and DM90 billion next (excluding 
the costs of the Treuhand). If accurate, this 
will lead to a public sector deficit of above 
DM100 billion in both years, and ideas on how to 
finance this are already being put forward. 
Interestingly, these include privatisation of 
industries in which the West has a large stake, 
such as Lufthansa and Telekom. 
Fortunately, the possible inflationary effects of 
monetary union have not yet materialised. One 
possibility was that one-to-one monetary parity 
would lead to a spending boom by East Germans 
desperate to run down their savings on Western 
goods. While increased spending has indeed 
resulted in a boost in consumer demand, inflation 
has only just reached 3%, and continued tight 
monetary policy by the Bundesbank should ensure no 
major inflationary problems as a result of 
unification. 
PROGNOSIS 
The relatively rosy picture of gently slowing 
growth in the major industrialised countries is 
overshadowed somewhat by continuing stalemate in 
the Gulf, and would cloud considerably in the 
event of war. Such an outcome, and the higher oil 
prices which would inevitably result, could be 
enough to push the US into recession, but is 
unlikely to stifle growth in the leading economies 
of Germany and Japan. 
The main problems of much higher oil prices would 
actually be borne outside the major industrialised 
countries, by Eastern Europe, Latin America and 
the Third World. The first of these would suffer 
a double blow from an oil price surge, because 
they are just getting used to the idea of paying 
the world price for supplies of oil. In addition, 
Eastern European economies are hampered by being 
between 1.5 and 2.5 times as energy intensive as 
the West, which makes their vulnerability all the 
more acute. 
A further rise in the debt burdens of Latin 
American and Third World countries is unlikely to 
be to the long-run advantage of anyone, but this 
is one possible outcome from a sustained rise in 
the price of oil. And should the credit crunch 
mentioned in the Japanese section above not only 
materialise but extend beyond the Pacific rim, the 
outcome could endanger the orderly progression in 
industrialised economies which has characterised 
1990 so far. Overall, a period of considerable 
uncertainty. 
